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P
olicymakers who are concerned with understanding the cyclical state
of the economy will be interested in identifying the sustainable rate of
employment growth. If productivity growth is taken to be exogenous,
the rate at which jobs are created will determine growth in output. Assuming
that employment is measured reasonably well, a policymaker armed with
a measure of trend job growth will be able to glean information about the
economy’s status from the monthly employment report.
When attempting to determine this trend rate, one might posit as a ﬁrst
approximation that employment growth should be equal to the growth rate
of the population. At the very least, this assumes that the fraction of the
population employed will remain constant over time. However, a cursory
look at U.S. data reveals that this fraction has been rising persistently over the
postwar period. A robust determination of the sustainable rate of job creation
should therefore take account of this trend. Upon further inspection of the
available data, it becomes apparent that the driving forces behind this process
have been demographic trends, i.e., the “baby boom,” and, to a larger extent,
the increased participation of women in the labor market. In this article we
focus our attention on the latter determinant.
Female employment, expressed as a fraction of the working age popula-
tion, has been increasing steadily over the past 50 years. While most work
in this area has focused on the socioeconomic factors underlying this phe-
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nomenon, we explore the phenomenon’s effects on the larger economy within
the framework of a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model. Speciﬁ-
cally, we use a model that allows households to make labor supply decisions
along both the extensive margin—the decision to work outside the home or
not—and the intensive margin, along which workers adjust the number of
hours supplied to the outside market.
In our ﬁrst experiment, we model a reduction in participation costs for
female workers, that is, the implicit utility cost to the representative house-
hold incurred when a female member devotes time to outside work. Several
factors may have contributed to such a phenomenon. For instance, advances
in household technology such as those embedded in modern appliances have
automatedmanyofthechorespreviouslyaccomplishedentirelythroughphys-
ical labor. A general decline in birthrates over much of the period in question




the cost of participating in the outside labor market has fallen for women. We
ﬁnd that this decline in participation costs leads not only to an increase in
female participation, but also to a decline in the fraction of males who are
market employed. The latter result follows naturally as women replace men
in the workplace, but it is also reinforced by a wealth effect that leads men
optimally to choose greater leisure as overall consumption increases. We also
ﬁnd that the real rate of interest in our model economy is temporarily af-
fected by this process. What is left unexplained in this ﬁrst experiment is the
well-documented earnings gap that has existed historically between male and
female workers.
In our second experiment, we attempt to capture the effects of demand-
side, or employer-based, discrimination against female workers in order to
partially explain the behavior of the gender earnings gap. We do not attempt
toidentifywhichofthepotentialcausesofdiscriminationismostrelevant,nor
do we take a stand on its microeconomic underpinnings. Instead, we model
discriminationasareducedformconstraintontheamountoffemalelaborthat
ﬁrms are willing to employ. We then allow for this exogenous constraint to be
relaxedovertime. Inthisscenario, weﬁndthatreducedemploymentopportu-
nities for women generate both higher male employment and a larger gender
earnings gap than can be explained by human capital differences alone. As
opportunities for women expand in the model, female employment naturally
increases and the earnings gap narrows. As in the ﬁrst experiment, male em-
ployment falls partly as the result of optimal household behavior with respect
toleisure.Interestingly,ourmodelpredictsthatthegenderearningsgapwillbe
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of shocks to the economy. These results are all consistent with postwar U.S.
labor market experience.
Thearticleisdividedintothreeparts. Intheﬁrstsection,weanalyzesome
labor market data and attempt to estimate some reasonable approximations of
trend employment growth. The fact that employment rates have been far from
constantovertimecomplicatesthisestimation. Twoofthemainforcesdriving
the secular change in employment rates have been changes in demographics
and the gender composition of employment. We leave the analysis of demo-
graphics to further research, but understanding the role of gender motivates
the work in sections two and three.
1. SOME DATAANALYSIS OF U.S. LABOR MARKETS
To start, let us think of the working population (i.e., age 16 and over), P,i n
terms of three distinct pools: employed workers, denoted E; the unemployed,
U; and those outside the labor force who are not actively looking for work,Z.
We denote the labor force by N. Thus, we have that
P = E + U       
N
+ Z. (1)
Given equation (1), perhaps the simplest way in which to think about
the evolution of aggregate employment is to consider a long-run equilibrium
where each pool on the right-hand side of the equation grows at a constant
rate. Lettingγ X denotetheconstantgrowthrateofpoolX overagivenperiod,
it must then be the case that γ P = γ E = γ U = γ Z. In this scenario, we can
think of the level of job creation,  E, over the period used to measure growth
as
 E = γ PE. (2)
With employment currently at about 130 million and population growth hov-
ering around 1 percent annually, it turns out that  E equals roughly 110,000
at a monthly rate.
Equation (2) is often used to approximate a sustainable level of job cre-
ation, thatis, alevelofjobcreationthatdoesnotgenerateunduestraininlabor
markets. Accordingly, any job creation in excess of 110,000 might be consid-
ered above trend. However, the simple calculation we have just carried out is
subject to an important problem. If the growth rate of each pool is constant
and equal to population growth in some long-run equilibrium, the number of
employed workers, unemployed workers, and people outside the labor force
asafractionofthetotalpopulationshouldalsobeconstant. LookingatFigure
1, we can see that this has never in fact been the case.
While the unemployment rate, U/P, is often the focus of attention in both
academic research and the popular press, Figure 1 clearly shows that other
considerations also deserve attention. Speciﬁcally, in Figure 1, panel b, we4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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see that the employment rate, E/P, has shown a steady but important change
over the years. It was as low as 0.55 in 1950 and has gradually increased to
a high of 0.64 in 1999. Similarly, the fraction of population outside the labor
force, Z/P, has steadily fallen from approximately 0.41 in the early 1950s
to 0.33 today. In contrast, Figure 1, panel c, suggests that the unemployment
rate has remained roughly constant throughout the years at around 0.045.
Thus, it seems that to acquire a grasp of U.S. labor markets, it is as important
to understand movements in and out of employment that possibly stem from
changesinthepopulationoutsidethelaborforceasitistounderstandvariations
in unemployment. Moreover, because changes in E/P and Z/P appear to
have been very gradual over time, the source of these changes is likely to have
been structural in nature.
As we have just argued, it is not entirely clear in Figure 1, panel b, that
the fraction of employed workers has ever been in a steady state. More impor-
tantly, at ﬁrst glance it seems anyone’s guess where this fraction might settle,
if ever. One way to approach this issue would be simply to make a statistical
guess as to the behavior of E/P that allows for non-constant growth over
time. We would then be able to infer sustainable levels of job creation without
assuming that the share of each labor market pool in population is constant.
Thus, deﬁne ρE as E/P and let
ρE(t) =
a0
1 − a1e−a2(t−1948)2 , (3)
where t>0 denotes time. We choose the functional form depicted in (3)
because it will generally give rise to S-shaped curves as suggested by Figure
1, panel b. Furthermore, this functional form is convenient since the function
starts at a0/(1−a1) in 1948 and eventually asymptotes to a0. The parameters
a0 and a1, therefore, determine the bounds of the function while a2 controls
its degree of curvature. These features will allow us to keep ρE(t) bounded
betweenzeroandone. UnderdifferentassumptionsaboutwhatρE(t)mightbe
in the long run (i.e., different values of a0), we can then use the data available
on E/P to estimate a1 and a2 by Non-Linear Least Squares. The results from
this estimation are presented in Figure 2.
Under the assumption that the fraction of employed workers should even-
tuallysettleat0.65,closetoitscurrentlevel,itturnsoutthatasustainablelevel
of job creation for the year 2000 would be around 110,000 jobs at a monthly
rate. However, this number may be as high as 130,000 jobs for 2000 if we
expect that 3/4 of the working population should eventually be employed in
the long run. It is interesting to note that in all reasonable scenarios, current
employment to population ratios are above trend. In fact, for current employ-
ment to population ratios to be considered on trend, we would have to expect
alloftheworkingpopulationtobeemployedinthelongrun, whichisperhaps
a somewhat unrealistic scenario.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Non-Linear Estimation of Trend Employment
Once it has been established that the fraction of employed workers has
beenfarfromconstantoverthelast50years,anaturalquestiontoaskis: What
structural changes have driven the evolution of E/P during this period? We
explore the two most important sources of structural change in this section:
the continually changing role of gender in labor markets and the impact of
demographic considerations.
The Role of Gender
Figure 3 illustrates employment rates by gender and the fraction of females
and males outside the labor force relative to their working population. TheC. D. Lantz and P.-D. G. Sarte: U.S. Employment Rates 7
most striking feature of Figure 3 is that the employed males to male popula-
tion ratio and the males outside the labor force to male population ratio have
steadily moved in a direction opposite to that suggested by their aggregate
counterparts. The fraction of employed males began to increase in 1990 but
currently falls well short of its historic high in the early 1950s. Similarly, the
fractionofmalesnotlookingforemployment(relativetothemalepopulation)
is now twice what it was in the late 1940s. In sharp contrast, the employment
rate of women has gradually risen from a low of 0.30 in the late 1940s to a
high of 0.58 today; that is, only 30 percent of the female working population
was employed at the end of World War II. The fraction of females outside
the labor force has also steadily fallen over the postwar period. Hence, it
appears that aggregate employment rates are largely driven by the increasing
participation of women in the labor force. Furthermore, assuming that there
are no fundamental differences between men and women in their preferences
towards work, we might expect that E/P and Z/P should converge to the
same values for these two groups.
Figure 4 shows employment rates by gender as well as cohort and further
reinforces the ideas we have just presented. Consider, for instance, the cohort
of women who are 20 years old in 1948–1949. The employment rate for
women actually falls between ages 20 and 30, increases up to age 50, and
drops off as they retire. The fall in the employment rate between ages 20 and
30 can presumably be attributed to childbirth or the rearing of young children.
In contrast, consider the cohort of women 20 years of age in 1968–1969. Not
only is their employment rate higher across the board, but also the dip that
occursatage30doesnotstandout. Itisnoteworthythatthemaleemployment
rate only shows a small decrease by cohort. Overall, therefore, increases in
the employment rate at all ages are mostly driven by female labor behavior.
The continuously increasing female employment rate just documented is
generallythoughttobetheresultofbothdemand-andsupply-sidefactors. On
the demand side, Jacobsen (1994) argues that part of the increase can simply
be attributed to a general rise in labor demand stemming from technological
advances in production. In addition, the noticeable rise in women’s education
over the past 50 years has led to increased demand for female workers in a
world that is becoming more and more service oriented. Of course, a question
immediately arises as to what factors prompted the growth in women’s edu-
cation in the ﬁrst place. According to Jacobsen (1994, p. 128), these factors
include “a relaxation of social restrictions on appropriate levels and types of
education for women, and greater resources on the part of families who might
previously have had to ration education among their children.” Finally, a de-
clineinlabormarketdiscriminationagainstwomenmayalsohavecontributed
to a rise in female labor demand.
Explanations of demand-side discrimination usually fall into two broad
categories. On one hand, neoclassical models propose that labor market out-8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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comes are in part a function of agents’ personal prejudices or tastes against
associating with particular demographic groups, as in Becker (1957). In the
case of gender discrimination, these tastes may be a function of employers’
or customers’ perception of appropriate roles for women and men. On the
other hand, models of statistical discrimination assume that employers must
make hiring decisions in the face of incomplete information or uncertainty, as
in Phelps (1972). Since it is impossible to assess the exact level of produc-
tivity associated with a particular job candidate, employers make inferences
based on observed or perceived correlation between productivity and various
employee characteristics. To the degree that women are perceived to be less
productive or dependable than their male counterparts, they will face reduced
employment opportunities and wages. One might expect such perceptions to
be biased by long-standing attitudes toward gender differences, which may
adjust only slowly over time, even in the face of accumulated evidence to the
contrary.
Antidiscrimination legislative efforts may have played an important role




women was taking place in the years that followed World War II. TitleVII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex. The Equal Opportunity Act of
1972 strengthened the 1964 legislation by expanding its coverage to state and
local governments as well as educational institutions. Furthermore, it granted
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the power to sue
private sector respondents. Beller (1982) ﬁnds that enforcement of Title VII,
as measured by the number of completed EEOC investigations and successful
settlements, was signiﬁcant in reducing the gender gap both in wages and
in the probability of being employed in male dominated occupations for the
period 1967 to 1974. Furthermore, these studies indicate that Title VII was
more effective following the passage of the 1972 amendment.
On the supply side, economic considerations that are likely to have in-
duced increased female employment rates include rising wages for women,
changes in family composition, and especially changes in non-market pro-
duction technology. Jacobsen (1994, p. 129) writes that during the “twentieth
century, technology has been widely adopted that has enabled families to pro-
duce non-market output at lower cost. In particular, we have seen the spread
of market goods and services that serve as critical inputs into non-market pro-
duction. In 1920, one-third of homes had electricity; ... by 1960, practically
all homes were electriﬁed. In 1940, 17 percent of farm homes had indoor
running water, ... by 1970, 93 percent of rural homes had running water.” Of
course, for advances in home production technology to cause a rise in femaleC. D. Lantz and P.-D. G. Sarte: U.S. Employment Rates 11
employment rates in the postwar period, we must assume that the responsibil-
ity for housework (e.g., meal preparation and cleanup, clothing maintenance,
housecleaning, etc.) has disproportionately fallen on women. A 1965 study
found that women spent an average of 37.8 hours per week engaged in unpaid
household chores and childcare. Men, on average, spent only 10.0 hours per
week involved in these tasks.1 A later study, conducted in 1986, revealed that
women were spending 31.9 hours per week on these duties, compared to 18.1
hours for men.2 These data clearly suggest that female household members
have more likely been responsible for household work over the years.
It is interesting that as the female employment rate steadily increases in
Figure 3, panel a, the male employment rate progressively falls in panel c.
This observation is often interpreted to mean that as the male employment
rate fell, women were hired to ﬁll the newly created vacancies. However, this
reasoning sidesteps the question of why men were gradually less willing to
work at particular jobs. We shall argue in this article that, in fact, the direction
ofcausalitymaywellruntheotherway. Ifimportantchangesintheeconomic
environment made it less costly for women to work in the marketplace, the
resultingincreaseinfamilyincomemayhaveledtoawealtheffectthatreduced
male labor supply. Note that in the latter scenario, males are not displaced by
females in jobs but would optimally choose to work less.
2. GENDERAND LABOR MARKETS:
ANAPPLICATION OF THE CHO-COOLEY MODEL
Although both demographic considerations and the changing role of gender
havebeencrucialdeterminantsoftheU.S.aggregateemploymentrate,forsim-
plicity we shall conﬁne our theoretical analysis to the role of gender within a
generalequilibriumdynamicframework. Inexploringhowtothinkaboutgen-
der within a neoclassical model, we shall address the various implications of
advances in home production technology, the different factors that might un-
derlie differences in gender earnings, and the role of discrimination in general
equilibrium.
A Basic Framework without Discrimination
Aswesawintheprevioussection,boththefemaleandmaleemploymentrates
have displayed considerable variation over the postwar period. To address
this fact within the context of an artiﬁcial economy, we shall need a model
1 Source: Multinational Comparative Time-budget Research Project—National Survey, 1965
(Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan).
2 Source: Study of Americans’ Use of Time, 1986 (Survey Research Center, University of
Maryland).12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that allows workers to adjust their labor supply both along the intensive and
extensive margins as in Cho and Cooley (1994).
Consider a closed economy populated by a large number of households
thatcompriseacontinuumofmembersuniformlydistributedon[0,2]. House-
holds are composed of men and women in equal proportion, working mem-
bers of the current generation. Each household cares about the welfare and
resources of its present as well as future descendants. As in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin(1995,chapter2),thisintergenerationalconsiderationmaybemodeled
by assuming that the current generation maximizes utility subject to a bud-
get constraint over an inﬁnite horizon. Thus, we shall in effect analyze the
decisions of an immortal extended family.3 For the sake of transparency, we
assume that the size of each extended family is constant over time.
Let 0 ≤ hf ≤ 1 represent the normalized number of hours supplied by
a female worker to the market on any given day. (Throughout the remain-
der of the article, the subscripts f and m will stand for females and males
respectively.) Further, we deﬁne afh
γ+1
f /(γ + 1) as the disutility that a fe-
male household member experiences when she provides hf hours of work. If





f /(γ + 1)
 





m /(γ + 1)
 
em denotetotalfamilydisu-
tility derived from male labor. Observe that if af = am, then men and women
have identical preferences with respect to the number of hours spent work-
ing and, consequently, should have identical labor supply schedules along the
intensive margin.
Turning our attention to the extensive margin, we follow Cho and Cooley
(1994) and assume that there exists a cost associated with each time a house-
hold member chooses to work. The idea is that participating in the labor force
requires that real resources be spent in the replacement of household produc-
tion. For example, we can think of these resources as the cost of replacing
services such as child care or domestic maintenance while agents are away at
work.4 Cho and Cooley (1994) express the utility costs associated with the
replacement of household services as an increasing function of the number of
working household members, bieτ
i /(τ + 1), i = m,f. In the context of the
model presented here, the assumption that the burden of housework fell more
heavily upon women for a considerable fraction of the past 50 years may be
interpreted asbf >b m. To a degree, this inequality in the cost of market work
can also be interpreted as the unfavorable social stigma that working women
may have carried earlier in this century. Observe that from the vantage point
3 See Barro (1974) for a formal derivation of this modeling assumption with parental altruism.
4 Cho and Cooley (1994) show explicitly how to map household production into agents’ pref-
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of the household as a whole, the total costs associated with having female
members work is bfe
τ+1
f /(τ + 1) and is similar for male members.
In each period, female and male workers receive wages wf,t and wm,t
respectivelyinexchangefortheirlaborservices. Householdsalsoowncapital,
Kt, from which they earn interest income, rtKt, and discount the future at the
rate 0 <β<1. Income is either saved in the form of capital accumulation
or used to purchase consumption goods, Ct. Given the features of the model
we have just described, the representative household maximizes its expected
utility into the inﬁnite future,
























0 <σ < 1,
subject to the following budget constraint,
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt =
 
i=f,m
wi,thi,tei,t + rtKt, (5)
Ct ≥ 0,K t ≥ 0,K 0 > 0 given,
where 0 <δ<1 is the depreciation rate on capital. Note that in this frame-
work,ei,t carriestheinterpretationoftheemploymentrateofgenderi inperiod




















rt+1 + 1 − δ
  
= 0. (8)
Equation (6) can be thought of as a labor supply schedule for each gender
along the intensive margin. As noted earlier, when af = am, these labor sup-
ply schedules are identical. In fact, the number of weekly hours spent at work
has been slightly lower for women than for men over the last two decades.
However, the ratio of female hours to male hours has been creeping up some-
what during that period. In addition, differences between genders in weekly
hours at work are nowhere near as large as differences in employment rates.
In our model economy, employment rates for each gender are determined by
equation (7). The ﬁrst two terms of this equation denote the marginal costs
of having an additional household member work in the marketplace while the
third term captures its marginal beneﬁt in utility terms. Finally, equation (8)
equates the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost of saving an additional unit
of the consumption good.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Firmsintheeconomyproducegoods, paywagestofemaleandmalelabor
Lf and Lm respectively, and make rental payments on capital. Each ﬁrm has











, 0 <α<1,and ρ ≤ 1, (9)
where At embodies shifts in total factor productivity. We interpret zf and zm
as factors that might inﬂuence the productivity of genders differently in the
market. For example, we noted earlier the substantial increase in women’s
education over the postwar period. In principle, therefore, both zf and zm
should be endogenously determined and time varying. However, in the case
of education, the gradual narrowing of differences in education between gen-
ders was partly due to a relaxation of social restrictions on women. It will
be simplest, therefore, to take zf and zm as reduced form parameters. The
parameter ρ captures the elasticity of substitution between male and female
labor in production, which in this case is given by 1/(ρ − 1). Hence, male
and female labor are perfect substitutes when ρ = 1, and one might think of
this scenario as a suitable benchmark.
At each point in time, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts and solve,
max  t = Yt − rtKt − wf,tLf,t − wm,tLm,t, (10)





































m,t − wm,t = 0. (13)












Thus, when male and female workers are perfect substitutes into production,
only factors that affect differences in gender productivity affect the gender
earnings ratio. Of course, at this stage, equation (14) abstracts from discrimi-
nation. Figure5,panela,showsthatoverthelast20years,malemedianweekly
earnings have consistently exceeded those of females (i.e., wf,t/wm,t < 1).
However, panel b shows an increasing trend in the gender earnings ratio dur-
ing that period. Interestingly, this reduction in the male/female earnings gap
appears to have slowed down as of 1994.
An equilibrium for this economy consists of households’optimality con-
ditions (6) through (8), ﬁrms’ optimality conditions (11) through (13), and16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
goods and labor market clearing conditions,
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = Yt (15)
and
Li,t = ei,thi,t i = f,m. (16)
3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we study several numerical examples in order to gain insight
into the dynamic general equilibrium effects of different changes in the eco-
nomic environment. We investigate the effects of a reduction in the female
cost of market work. We also examine how a loosening of discriminatory hir-
ing practices against women affects the overall economy. The idea of women
facing reduced employment opportunities in the workplace may seem some-
what outdated by today’s standards. Nevertheless, it remains that this notion
may have substantially contributed to the gender wage gap over the last 50
years.
To explore these issues in greater detail, we must ﬁrst assign values to the
exogenous parameters of the model we have just presented. The parameters
af and am are set to 19 and 16 respectively, implying that hf = 0.313 while
hm = 0.374. Assuming that agents can work a maximum of 16 hours a day,
7 days a week, these values translate into 35 weekly hours spent working for
femalesand42hoursformales. Wesetτf andτm to1.31and1.10respectively




in production, ρ = 1. We normalize zf to 1 and set zm to 1.20 so as to obtain
a gender earnings ratio of 0.83. While Figure 5, panel b, suggests that the
gender earnings ratio is currently 0.76, Blau and Kahn (1997) ﬁnd that 43
percent of the gap cannot be explained by human capital differences with the
implication that much of the unexplained portion results from discriminatory
practices.5 On the other hand, Kim and Polacheck (1994) have conducted
empirical research suggesting that the “unexplained” portion can be reduced
50 percent when estimates allow for unobservable individual-speciﬁc effects,
which the authors think of as individual differences in motivation. We choose
an intermediate level and model 30 percent of the gender earnings ratio as
5 Blau and Kahn consider 1979 and 1988 PSID data. They ﬁnd that the earnings ratio
increased from 0.62 to 0.72 over that period. Adjusting for human capital variables, the ratios
are 0.72 and 0.80, respectively. Adjusting for human capital and industry, occupation and collective
bargaining status, the ratios are 0.78 and 0.88. The unexplained portion of the pay gap (in 1988)
is therefore given by 1−0.88
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Table 1a Benchmark Steady Rate
Aggregate Characteristics
Consumption 0.469
Rate of Interest 0.070
Investment:Output Ratio 0.255
Gender Earnings Ratio 0.833
Labor Force Gender Characteristics Male Female
Weekly Hours 42 35
Employment Rate 0.720 0.577




Rate of Interest 0.070
Investment:Output Ratio 0.255
Gender Earnings Ratio 0.760
Labor Force Gender Characteristics Male Female
Weekly Hours 42 33
Employment Rate 0.73 0.523
resulting from discrimination. In other words, the women’st om e n ’s wage
ratio is 0.76 and 70 percent of that gap is attributable to factors other than
discrimination. This means that absent discrimination, this ratio would be
0.83, and that is how the no-discrimination model is calibrated. We shall
think of a period as a year in the numerical examples so that β is set to 0.98.
All other parameters are chosen symmetrically for men and women and set to
the values in Cho and Cooley (1994). In particular, we have bm = bf = 0.8,
σ = 2, γ = 0.8, and α = 0.64. Table 1a summarizes key aspects of the
model steady state that arise from the calibration presented here.
The ﬁrst experiment we carry out considers the effects of a protracted
fall in the female labor market participation cost. As advances in household
production—as well as changing attitudes—have made it progressively easier
for women to join the labor force, we wish to analyze their general equilib-
rium implications for other variables. In the second experiment, we introduce
reduced employment opportunities for women as a way of modeling discrim-
ination. We explain how such reduced opportunities can generate a gender
wagegapandanalyzetheeffectsofapermanentchangeintotalfactorproduc-
tivity in that environment. As in the data, changes in total factor productivity18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
willgenerateacountercyclicalgenderearningsratio. Finally,weshallanalyze
the effects of a gradual reduction in discrimination against female labor.
The Dynamic Effects of a Reduction in Female Labor
Market Participation Costs
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of a gradual fall in the cost of market work for
women. In Figure 6, panel a, we show that this is modeled as a permanent
10 percent fall in the value of bf over 16 years. This gradual reduction in the






ut = ut−1 + εt and
16  
j=1
ωj = 1. (18)
Since bf,t falls gradually, we should expect that both male and female em-
ployment rates should also respond incrementally over time as suggested in
Figures 1 and 3. Observe in Figure 6, panel d, that the reduction in women’s
labor market costs directly implies a 4 percent permanent rise in the female
employment rate. As we had conjectured, therefore, historical changes in the
female employment rate are consistent with technological advances in home
production. In addition, some interesting general equilibrium effects emerge.
Because the utility cost of market work for women is permanently lower, ag-
gregateconsumptioneventuallyrisestoahighersteadystateinFigure6,panel
b. This rise in aggregate consumption translates into a wealth effect that actu-
allycausesafallinthemaleemploymentrate(andmaleworkhours)inFigure
6,panelc. Notethatequations(6)and(7),whichcharacterizelaborsupplyfor
each gender, both depend on aggregate consumption. Of course, wages also
adjust downward in this experiment, leading to a substitution effect, which
reinforces the reduction in male employment. In other words, some degree
of crowding out does take place as women enter the labor market. On the
whole, in a manner consistent with Figure 3, panels a and c, advances in home
production technology lead not only to a rise in the female employment rate
but also a fall in its male counterpart. However, in the ﬁnal steady state,
the magnitude of the change in the male employment rate is relatively small
compared to that in the female employment rate.
It is also worth noting that a reduction in the labor participation cost of
women examined here implies a temporary rise in the rate of interest. As
is typical of neoclassical frameworks, changes in the rate of interest mimic
changesinthegrowthrateofconsumption(seeequation(8)). Finally, observeC. D. Lantz and P.-D. G. Sarte: U.S. Employment Rates 19
Figure 6 The Effects of a Reduction in the Female Labor Participation
Cost20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
that this particular example is also useful in illustrating the forward-looking
behavior of household members. Since advances in home production tech-
nology are gradual, reductions in women’s cost of market work today signal
further reductions in the future. Anticipating these future reductions, male
workers cut back their labor supply contemporaneously despite the fact that
the initial decline in market costs is quite small. Given that the capital stock
is predetermined when the shock occurs, production also falls contemporane-
ously. It follows that consumption falls on impact as shown in Figure 6, panel
b.
The General Equilibrium Impact of Reduced
Employment Opportunities for Women
In the numerical experiment we have just carried out, the gender earnings
ratio remained unaffected and constant as suggested by equation (14). How-
ever, this equation only captures one notion of the earnings gap based on
differing gender productivity. We argued earlier, for instance, that the human
capital embodied in female workers had risen substantially over the past ﬁve
decades because of increased education. We now show how demand-side dis-
crimination in the form of reduced employment opportunities for women can
contribute to lowering female earnings.
Considerthemodelpresentedintheprevioussection. Withthehousehold
side unchanged, male and female labor supply continue to obey equations
(6) and (7). However, suppose that ﬁrms are unwilling to manage more than
  Lf > 0 units of female labor. As in Phelps (1972), we can imagine that this
labor demand constraint stems from the perception that female labor is less
dependable or productive than male labor. According to Goldin (1990), ﬁrms
have often viewed gender as a sign of shorter expected job tenure, leading to
job segregation and limited opportunities for women. Firms then maximize
proﬁts in (10) subject to
Lf,t ≤   Lf. (19)
Letting   wf,t denote the new female wage that emerges from this constrained













where φt ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (19).
Notethatintheprevioussection, themarketequilibriumvalueoffemalelabor
was increasing in female productivity, zf. Thus, the more productive female
labor, the more likely equation (19) is to bind. When this is the case, φt > 0
and a lower gender earnings ratio emerges.
Table 1b describes the steady state that obtains when   Lf is calibrated to
generate a gender earnings ratio of 0.76 as suggested by the most recent ratiosC. D. Lantz and P.-D. G. Sarte: U.S. Employment Rates 21
Table 2a Gender Earnings Ratio and GDP
U.S. Economy
Corr(Yt,wf, t+k/wm, t+k) for k =
−3 −2 −1 012 3
−0.050 −0.107 −0.169 −0.234 −0.310 −0.330 −0.332
Table 2b Gender Earnings Ratio and GDP
Model Economy
Corr(Yt,wf, t+k/wm, t+k) for k =
−3 −2 −1 012 3
−0.354 −0.550 −0.762 −0.985 −0.661 −0.395 −0.165
[0.14] [0.11] [0.07] [0.00] [0.07] [0.11] [0.13]
in Figure 5, panel b. Aside from the fall in both the female employment rate
and female work hours that naturally follows, we wish to stress the following
two points. First, the male employment rate rises somewhat to compensate
for the drop in female labor input; however, this increase is less than one-
for-one since zm >z f. Second, and more important, steady state household
consumption falls by 3.62 percent. This decline in consumption reﬂects the
efﬁciency loss that emerges when 30 percent of the gender wage gap is due to
discriminatory hiring practices against women.
Figure 5, panel c, suggests a negative correlation between the cyclical
components of the gender earnings ratio and real GDP. Table 2a conﬁrms
this negative correlation at different leads and lags. An argument often cited
to explain this negative correlation is that in periods of boom, women are
more likely to be new entrants or re-entrants in the job market since the male
participation rate is already high. Relative to women who are already part
of the labor force, however, the marginal female worker is likely to be less
productive. Hence, one expects the median female wage to decrease in times
of economic expansion. An implicit assumption here is that there exists some
heterogeneity among female workers.
Aside from the compositional effect we have just described, there may be
otherfactorsthatcontributetoacountercyclicalgenderearningsratio. Infact,
in the framework with reduced female employment opportunities presented
in this section, the gender earnings ratio will move in a direction opposite
to that of output when the economy is mainly driven by shifts in total factor
productivity. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of output and the gender22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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earningsratiotoa2percentpermanentincreaseintotalfactorproductivity. As
expected,outputrisesonimpactandincreasesmonotonicallytoahighersteady
state level. In contrast, the gender wage ratio falls both contemporaneously
and in the long run. Because ﬁrms are unwilling to hire more than a given
level of female labor input, the female wage exhibits inertia despite the rise
in productivity. The male wage, on the other hand, unambiguously increases
as the demand for male labor shifts out in response to the productivity shock.
Consequently, the gender earnings ratio falls in periods of boom.
In Table 2b, we present the cross-correlations of output and the gender
earnings ratio obtained at different leads and lags when the productivity pro-
cess is calibrated as
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εA,t, (21)
where ρA = 0.95 and εA,t is a random variable with mean zero and standard
deviation of 0.01.6 The model statistics are the mean values calculated from
200 simulations of samples with 80 observations each, the size of the sample
for the data in Figure 3. In square brackets are the standard deviations of the
sample statistics. As suggested by the impulse responses in Figure 7, output
and the gender earnings ratio are negatively correlated at all leads and lags,
muchmoresoinfactthaninthedata. Whileourmodelmissessomeimportant
dimensions, such as heterogeneity among workers that would give rise to the
type of compositional effect discussed above, our result also suggests that
there may be other key sources of shocks aside from shifts in total factor
productivity.
Finally,Figure8showsthedynamiceffectsofagradual2percentimprove-
ment in female employment opportunities (i.e.,    Lf > 0). As the constraint
on female employment becomes less binding, the economy becomes more
efﬁcient and aggregate consumption rises in Figure 8, panel a. At the same
time, the female wage rises closer to its unconstrained equilibrium so that the
gender earnings ratio increases in panel b. Note in Figure 8 that as the female
employmentraterisesinresponsetoalooseremploymentconstraint,themale
employment rate correspondingly falls. This is not only because the rise in
female employment is making work opportunities scarcer for male labor; in
this case, the fall in male employment is partly a reﬂection of the wealth effect
induced by the increase in aggregate consumption. Thus, as the economy
becomes more efﬁcient, men choose to reduce how much they work. Further,
this exercise suggests that the rise in the female employment rate in Figure 3,
panel a, and the simultaneous decline in the male employment rate in panel c,
are consistent with a continuing relaxation of discriminatory hiring practices
against female labor. A loosening of the constraint on female employment
6 This particular process for total factor productivity is standard in the real business cycle
literature.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 The Effects of Relaxing the Female Labor ConstraintsC. D. Lantz and P.-D. G. Sarte: U.S. Employment Rates 25
opportunities has the same effects on gender employment rates as a decrease
in women’s costs of market work. Both of these changes in the economic
environment are consistent with the behavior of employment rates by gender
since the end of World War II.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have documented that U.S. employment rates have changed considerably
over the postwar period. The data suggest that both demographic and gender
speciﬁc factors have been important forces underlying the evolution of these
rates. We have focused speciﬁcally on the role of gender heterogeneity in
determining aggregate employment rates, and we have also developed the
implications of gender differences for the overall economy.
Within a stochastic general equilibrium framework, we have modeled the
effects of a reduction in female employment participation costs, as well as
a reduction in employer-based gender discrimination. Reduced employment
costs, while giving rise to higher levels of female employment, also generate
lower rates of male employment through both a wealth and a substitution
effect at the household level. Reduced participation costs do not, however,
explain the historical behavior of the gender earnings gap. Employer based
discrimination is then introduced as a constraint on the measure of female
labor that ﬁrms are willing to employ. In the presence of such discrimination,
a gender earnings gap emerges in excess of what can be explained by relative
differences in productivity. This model-generated pay gap is countercyclical
in nature, rising in periods of economic contraction and diminishing when the
economy booms, thus approximating what is seen in U.S. data. When the
constraint on female labor is relaxed over time, the model predicts gradually
rising levels of female employment, which endogenously lead to lower rates
of male employment and a narrowing gender wage gap. The latter predictions
have also been stylized features of U.S. labor market experience.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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